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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that employers have the 
burden to prove Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c), where the current 
statute incorporated the employee's common law burden of proof and 
codified the employer's common law defenses. Standard of Review: 
Correction of error, Beaver County v. Utah Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357 
(Utah 1996) under a sliding scale for abuse of discretion. Drake v. Indus. 
Comm Vz, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Preservation of issue: Decided by 
the Court of Appeals, Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2004 UT App 
278 f4. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Whether the employer or the employee has the burden to prove Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413(l)(c) is governed by this Court's interpretation of that statute. The statute is 
set forth in Appellants' addendum. 
Whether the Labor Commission's denial of benefits was correctly reviewed for 
abuse of discretion is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h), and is set forth 
verbatim in Appellee's addendum in Respondent's Brief. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Martinez briefly worked for Media-Paymasters Plus as an extra on a movie 
set. Mr. Martinez also held a second job at McDonald's as a fast food worker. On 
October 28, 1996, Mr. Martinez sustained significant permanent injuries when he fell 
down some stairs on the movie set. His injuries included his neck, right shoulder, and 
right hand. Mr. Martinez filed an application for hearing, and the Commission found that 
he had sustained the aforementioned injuries, resulting in permanent impairment, 
temporary total disability and medical treatment expenses. 
Mr. Martinez tried to return to work with both Media-Paymasters Plus and 
McDonald's, but neither employer would accommodate his limitations. Mr. Martinez 
then applied for social security disability benefits and was awarded benefits as of the day 
of his industrial accident. He then filed an application for hearing, seeking an award of 
permanent total disability benefits. ' 
At the hearing, Mr. Martinez put on evidence that he was entitled to benefits. 
Media-Paymasters Plus' only witness testified that there were no jobs he could do, and 
that he might only work if an employer created a new job, or modified an existing job 
tailored to his limitations. The Administrative Law Judge denied Mr. Martinez's claim, 
Mr. Martinez appealed to the Labor Commission, but the Commission denied his appeal. 
The Commission concluded that Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of a 
fast food worker, and that work was "reasonably available" to him. The Commission did 
2 
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not mention the employer's admission that no jobs existed that Mr. Martinez could 
perform. Mr. Martinez appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's denial. It concluded that 
employees need only prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b), and that 
employers have the burden to prove the affirmative defenses set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c). The court also reviewed the Commission's conclusions for abuse of 
discretion. It determined that the Commission abused its discretion when it ignored 
limitations it specifically adopted, and when it ignored Media-Paymasters Plus' admission 
that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Employers have the burden to prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(l)(c). The statute codified and modified Utah common law for permanent total 
disability claims. At common law, employees had the burden to prove that they were 
permanently totally disabled by showing that their industrial injuries prevented them from 
performing their jobs. The current statute codified this common law element at Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(ii). The current statute states that employees have the 
burden to prove three elements - including the common law requirement - to "establish 
entitlement to benefits." Id. at § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii). Just like common law, the 
burden then shifts to the employer to prove its affirmative defenses. 
3 
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The current statute codified employers' common law defense, namely, the 
existence of readily available work. It also expanded employers5 defenses. Under the 
current statute, employers can defeat employee's claims by proving one of four listed 
defenses: (i) the employee is gainfully employed; (ii) them employee's impairment does 
not limit his ability to do basic work activities; (iii) the impairments do not prevent him 
from performing the essential functions of his job; and, (iv) the employee can perform 
other reasonably available work. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(i)-(iv). The 
Commission "shall conclude" that the employees' facts meet all four listed criteria "to 
find an employee permanently totally disabled." Id. 
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision, and conclude that employers have 
the burden to prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c) for several 
compelling reasons. First, the plain language of the statute expressly limited employees' 
burden of proof to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b). Second, if the Court concludes 
that the statute was ambiguous, there was no legislative intent on this issue when the 
current statute was passed. Nor was the statement of legislative intent valid under H.B. 
150 because the bill violated the separation of powers, and was not expressly retroactive. 
Third, holding that employers have the burden to prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413(l)(c) was consistent with Utah common law, and the statute used the same 
essential common law terms. Finally, holding that employers have the burden to prove 
their affirmative defenses is consistent with public policy. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY GAVE LITTLE IF ANY 
DEFERENCE TO THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS AS TO 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
The Court of Appeals correctly gave no deference to the Commission's erroneous 
determination that employers have the burden to prove part (c). Whether an agency 
properly allocated burdens of proof is a question of law is viewed for correctness. Beaver 
County v. Utah Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996). "Because the allocation of 
burdens of proof is a question of law, and [the applicable code section] does not 
'explicitly] grant discretion/ we must 'grant the commission no deference . . . , applying 
a correction of error standard [of review].'" Id. at 357 (citations omitted). In that case, 
this Court granted no discretion to the tax commission's allocation of who had the burden 
of proof. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals properly reviewed for correctness when it 
reviewed the Commission's assignment of the burden to prove part (c) to employees. The 
statute gave the Labor Commission no discretion to determine who had the burden of 
proof, and therefore its decision was entitled to no deference. As to the issue of burden of 
proof, this Court should hold that the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed for legal error 
with no deference to the Commission's conclusions. 
That said, the statute gave the Commission implied discretion to apply the law to 
the facts. Where statutes confer implied discretion, reviewing courts apply a sliding scale 
5 
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of strictness. Sierra Club v. Utah Solid Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 341 
(Utah App 1998) (citing Drake v. Indus. Comm % 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) with 
approval). This sliding scale encompasses "varying degrees of strictness, falling 
anywhere between a review for correctness and a broad abuse of discretion standard." 
Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals properly reviewed the Commission's application of the law to the facts 
- whether Martinez he could perform the "essential" functions of his job, or whether 
work was "reasonably available" - for abuse of discretion. Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 
fio.1 
But determining burdens of proof was strictly a matter of statutory interpretation, 
and should be reviewed for legal error (or something close to it) under Drake. The statute 
did not confer the Commission any discretion to engage in strict statutory intepretation; 
instead, it implicitly let the Commission apply the law to the facts. The Commission's 
erroneous interpretation of the parties burdens of proof was properly reviewed for 
correctness (or something close to it), and this Court should affirm the Martinez decision. 
1
 Abuse of discretion review encompasses review for reasonableness and 
rationality. Morton InVl v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 
587-88 (Utah 1991). 
6 
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IL EMPLOYERS HAVE THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-413Q¥c) BECAUSE: (A) THE STATUTE'S 
PLAIN LANGUAGE SO REQUIRES: (B) THERE WAS NO CONTRARY 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT: (C) THE STATUTE CODIFIED AND 
EXPANDED UTAH COMMON LAW: AND (D) IT IS CONSISTENT WITH 
PUBLIC POLICY IN WORKERS COMPENSATION CASES. 
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because it correctly held that 
employers have the burden to prove Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c). This Court 
should conclude that the statute unambiguously limited employees' burdens of proof to 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(l)(b) [Hereinafter: "part (b)"], and that the employer had 
the burden to plead and prove affirmative defenses contained in Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
413(l)(c) [Hereinafter: "part (c)"]. Alternatively, if this Court concludes that the statute 
was ambiguous as to whether employers must prove the elements of part (c), it should 
hold that the employer had the burden, and uphold the Martinez decision for four reasons. 
First, the legislature expressed no intent as to who had the burden of proof when it passed 
the current statute, and the recent enactment of H.B. 150 was an impermissible attempt by 
the legislature to determine the outcome of a pending case, and was invalid, but in any 
case, not retroactive. Second, the Martinez decision applied standard grammar and 
punctuation to the statute, and was consistent with established rules of statutory 
construction. Third, the Martinez decision was consistent with established precedent. 
Finally, the Martinez decision was consistent with established public policy in workers' 
compensation cases. 
7 
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A. The Statute Unambiguously Limited Employees' Burden of Proof To 
413(l)(b). 
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because the plain language of the 
statute expressly limited employees' burdens of proof to part (b). This Court need not 
interpret a statute unless it is truly ambiguous. "The plain language controls the 
interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look beyond the plain 
language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos v. Mount ainland Builders, 
Inc., 2000 UT 2, ^ 13, 993 P.2d 207, 210. In this case, the plain language of the statute 
shows that employers have the burden to prove part (c). 
At the time of Mr. Martinez' accident in 1996, the permanent total disability 
statute read in pertinent part: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause 
of the employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall 
conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that 
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential 
functions of the work activities for which the employee has been 
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational 
8 
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disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability 
claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking 
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)-(c)(1994). The plain language of the statute showed 
that employers have the burden to prove part (c). 
The pertinent portion of the statute consisted of two contrasting parts: part (b) and 
part (c). Part (b) specifically listed what employees must prove to "establish entitlement 
to permanent total disability benefits." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(l)(b). There were 
no other burdens or preconditions to employees' entitlement; only part (b). The plain 
language of the statute unambiguously limited employees' burden of proof to part (b). 
But the Commission's "conclusions" required under part (c) were qualitatively 
different than the facts employees had to prove under part (b). In contrast to part (b), part 
(c) required the commission to conclude that (i) the employee was not gainfully 
employed, (ii) the impairment limited the employees ability to do basic work activities, 
(iii) the employee could not perform the essential functions of the last job, and (iv) that 
the employee could not perform other "reasonably available" work. Id. at § 34A-2-
413(1 )(c)(i)—(iv). Only one possible conclusion can be drawn from the difference 
between what employees must prove for "entitlement" under part (b) and what the 
commission must conclude under part (c): employers have the burden to prove the facts in 
9 
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part (c), or the commission "shall conclude" that employees are permanently totally 
disabled. 
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because employers have the burden 
to prove part (c). The plain language of the statute showed that the legislature expressly 
limited employees' burden of proof to part (b). When the employee proved those facts, 
he established "entitlement to permanent total disability benefits." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413(l)(b). Employers had to prove part (c), or the commission "shall conclude" 
that the employee is permanently totally disabled. Ld. § 34A-2-413(l)(c). This Court 
should hold that the statute unambiguously limited employees' burdens of proof to part 
(b), and that employers have the burden to prove part (c). 
R This Court Should Affirm The Court of Appeals' Decision If It Concludes 
That The Statute Is Ambiguous. 
If this Court holds that the statute is ambiguous, it should affirm the Martinez 
decision because it was consistent with statutory construction, precedent, and public 
policy in interpreting workers compensation statutes. Before addressing those topics, 
however, this Court should conclude that the legislature never expressed its intent when it 
passed the current statute, and that H.B. 150 was invalid ab initio because it violated the 
separation of powers. Consequently, where there is no expressed legislative intent, this 
Court must rely on statutory construction, precedent, and public policy in interpreting 
workers compensation statutes. State v. Barrett, 127 P.3d 682 (Utah, 2005). 
Accordingly, this Court should uphold the Martinez decision. 
10 
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1. The Legislature Never Intended to Burden Employees With Proving 
Part (c). 
This Court should find that there was no legislative intent that employees must 
prove part (c) when the current statute was enacted. This Court may take judicial notice 
of legislative proceedings. Order at 1, Add. 37. But none of the transcripts provided by 
WCF show any legislative discussion on who has the burden of proof under part (c). To 
the contrary, the legislators only discussed the definition of permanent total disability, and 
not who had the burden of proof. Transcript of proceedings, S.B. 123 at 2.2 This Court 
should find that there is no evidence of the legislature's intent as to who has the burden of 
proof under part (c). Accordingly, this Court must look to statutory construction, 
precedent, and public policy. This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because 
statutory construction, precedent, and public policy supported its conclusion that 
employers have the burden to prove part (c). 
2
 In light of this Court's ruling that WCF may not supplement the record, 
Appellee's brief cites to the transcripts contained in WCF's brief, which are unofficial. 
There are no official transcripts that are part of this record. Therefore, should this Court 
find that the cited transcripts are not reliable sources of legislative intent, Appellee would 
withdraw this citation, and simply assert that there is no evidence of any legislative intent 
in support of Appellants or WCF's arguments. 
11 
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2. H.B. 150 Does Not Apply To This Case. 
The recent passage of H.B. 1503 has forced Mr. Martinez to address it in this brief. 
Appellants' Reply will predictably argue that H.B. 150 disposed of the burden of proof 
issue - as if this Court has no further responsibility in this case. This Court, however, 
must independently determine the law in this case, especially where the legislature 
improperly tried to dictate the result. Before voting, the legislative debate included an 
admission that the purpose of H.B. 150 was to correct an "error" in a "recent Court of 
Appeals case," Add. 10, thereby affecting the result in this case. Accordingly, this Court 
should find that legislative purpose was improper: This Court should hold that H.B. 150 
was invalid ab initio because it violated the separation of powers. Alternatively, this 
Court should find that H.B. 150 does not retroactively apply to this case. 
a. H.B. 150 Improperly Tried To Affect This Case. 
This Court should find that H.B. 150 improperly tried to dictate the outcome of 
this case. Legislatures may not decide the rule of law in a pending case. United States v. 
Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47, 20. L. Ed. 519 (1872). Where a law is passed to affect a 
pending case, it is invalid because it violates the separation of powers between the 
legislative and judicial branches. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-24, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 
3
 This Court granted certiorari on November 16, 2005. H.B. 150 was 
introduced in the House on January 24, 2006, and passed the House on February 21, 
2006. In the final hours of the last day of the legislative session on March 1, 2006, it 
passed the Senate. Last Friday, March 17, 2006, Governor Huntsman signed H.B. 150 
into legislation. 
12 
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96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), (per curiam); Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir. 1980). The facts show that the purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect 
this case, and should be invalidated by this Court. 
In the case of In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 
673 F. Supp 411 (W. D. Wash.), the court invalidated legislation under separation of 
powers principles because it was passed to affect a pending case. Between 1977 and 
1981, the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) issued $2.25 billion in 
municipal bonds to finance two major power projects. In 1981, the projects were 
terminated and litigation was started under the Washington State Securities Act (WSSA) 
to determine the repayment duties of the issuers. The standard of fault required to find 
civil liability under WSSA was not explicitly stated in the original legislation, but by 
1980, Washington courts had determined that negligence was the applicable standard. Id. 
at 414. In 1985, the Washington Legislature amended the WSSA, and raised the standard 
of fault to scienter. The legislation was not explicitly retroactive, and in 1986, the federal 
district court found that it only applied prospectively. Id. Within two weeks, the 
Legislature introduced new legislation (the "1986 Amendment") that was explicitly 
retroactive, and the court was again called on to determine the applicability of the law to 
the pending litigation. It concluded that the Washington Legislature violated the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers when it passed the new legislation. Id. at 
415. 
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The principle of separation of powers is fundamental to our 
system of government in which the legislature is to enact laws 
of general application, and courts are to decide particular 
cases arising under those laws. Legislative actions which 
contravene the principle of separation of powers are 
unconstitutional. It is not for the legislature to determine the 
rule of decision in a particular case, nor otherwise unduly 
impact judicial power to decide pending cases. 
Id. (citations omitted). The court found that the Legislature was candid about the purpose 
of the 1986 Amendment: to protect Washington utility ratepayers by protecting local 
entities, who if found liable, would increase utility rates. Id. The court found that the 
Legislature intended the 1986 Amendment to benefit the state's ratepayers by changing 
the rule entitling plaintiffs to relief, not by changing the remedy. The court observed that 
the remedy remained the same after the 1986 Amendment, but "the quantum and nature 
of proof required has been changed to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail 
against these public defendants." Id. at 416. The court concluded that the 1986 
Amendment was an unconstitutional intrusion on the judicial responsibility to resolve 
cases and controversies. Id. at 417. Similarly, this Court should find that the legislative 
purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect the outcome of this case, and that it violated the 
separation of powers. 
This Court is fully aware of the seriousness of legislative interference with the 
judiciary's responsibility to decide cases and controversies. "We recognize the potential 
mischief, indeed, the grave constitutional problems, that could arise if the Legislature 
were to attempt to determine the outcome of a particular case by passage of a law 
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intended to accomplish such a purpose." Foil v. Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 
1979). This Court should find that H.B. 150 was enacted to affect this case because: (1) 
the legislators freely admitted that H.B. 150 was to correct an "error" from this "recent 
Court of Appeals case"; and (2) the language of H.B. 150 precisely addressed the issue on 
appeal with significant input from Amicus WCF. For these reasons, this Court should 
find that the legislative purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect this case, and should invalidate 
H.B. 150 based on separation of powers principles. 
(i) Legislative Admission 
The legislature was told that H.B. 150 was intended to affect the outcome of this 
case moments before it voted to pass the bill. Senator Ed Mayne candidly explained: 
[H.B. 150] clarifies the long standing view that it is the 
workers' burden of proof to show an entitlement to permanent 
total disability benefits. A recent Court of Appeals case 
removes much of that employees' burden in this regard. 
Correcting this error will avoid an increase in claims costs 
associated with more permanent total disability cases 
generated because of relaxation of employees' burden of 
proof. 
Add. 10. Where the legislature was specifically told that H.B. 150 would correct the 
"error" that was the "recent Court of Appeals case," the express purpose of H.B. 150 was 
to affect the outcome of this case. 
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(ii) Precise Legislative Language With Significant 
Amicus Involvment. 
The language of H.B. 150 shows that it was enacted to affect the specific issues in 
this case. H.B. 150 contains, inter alia, amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(l)(b) and (c), specifically making employees prove all elements listed in both (b) and 
(c) - the very issue in this case. See Text of H.B. 150, Add. 12-36. Like the 1986 
Amendment in the In re Washington Public Power case, H.B. 150 sought to change the 
rule entitling Mr. Martinez to relief, and not his remedy. Like the 1986 Amendment, 
"the quantum and nature of proof required has been changed to make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to prevail" under H.B. 150. The language of H.B. 150 shows that it was drafted 
to make it more difficult for Mr. Martinez to prevail in this case. 
Amicus WCF was also significantly involved with H.B. 150fs passage. When it 
asked to be granted Amicus status, WCF told this Court about its financial interest in the 
outcome of this case, as a matter of precedent. Motion For Leave To Submit Brief Of 
Amicus Curiae at 1. On February 6, 2006, a WCF representative testified in support of 
H.B. 150 at the House Business and Labor Committee Meeting. App. 5. WCF told the 
legislators that H.B. 150 corrected the Court of Appeals case that had misconstrued the 
statute. App.7.4 WCF did not pass H.B. 150, and its participation in the legislative 
process was entirely lawful. But it is also evident that WCF was significantly involved in 
4
 The Appendix contains an internet link to the audio file of the February 6, 
2006 meeting. 
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H.B. 150's passage, and told legislators that H.B. 150 would correct the Martinez 
decision, even as it participated in its appeal. 
If this Court finds that the purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect this case, it must 
ignore its statement of legislative intent. Under the section, "legislative intent language" 
the bill reads: 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments to 
Section 34A-2-413 in this bill be interpreted as merely 
clarifying an existing principle that the employee bears the 
burden of proving that the employee is permanently totally 
disabled based on those factors listed as matters on which the 
commission is to make a conclusion in Subsection 34A-2-
413(1 )(c), as enacted before amendment of this bill. 
Add. 35-6. But this Court should not defer to the statement of legislative intent where 
H.B. 150 violated the separation of powers. Alternatively, if this Court concludes that 
H.B. 150 did not violate the separation of powers, it should, at minimum, view H.B. 150 
as an inauthentic source of legislative intent, given its dubious beginnings, and its 
whirlwind passage during the pendency of this appeal.5 
b. H.B. 150 Did Not Retroactively Apply To This Case. 
Even if HB 150 did not violate the separation of powers, this Court should find 
that H.B. 150 did not retroactively apply to this case because it contained no clear 
statement of retroactive application. Under Utah law, "[n]o part of these revised statutes 
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000). 
5
 See n.3 and accompanying text. 
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Accordingly, in Utah, a statute "generally cannot be given retroactive effect unless the 
legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute." Washington Nat. Ins. v. 
Sherwood Assoc. 795 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1990) (cited with approval in Thomas v. Color 
Country Mgmt., 2004 Utah 12 Tf 31, 84 P.3d 1201, 1210). H.B. 150 did not expressly 
state that it retroactively applied to pending cases, consequently, this Court should hold 
that it did not apply to this case. ' ' 
Nor was H.B. 150 retroactive because it substantively changed the parties burdens' 
of proof. H.B. 150 was not "merely procedural": "According to this exception, 
amendments that merely alter the procedure by which the substantive rights are 
adjudicated are retroactively applicable." Thomas, 2004 Utah 12 ^  33, 84 P.3d at 1210. 
Allocating the parties' burdens of proof was not merely procedural because it changed the 
substantive legal requirements for entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. 
Accord, Thomas, 2004 Utah 12 f 43, 84 P.3d at 1213. This Court should hold that H.B. 
150 has no retroactive application because it is substantively changed the requirements 
for permanent total disability benefits. 
3. The Statute's Punctuation and Rules of Statutory Construction Show 
That Employers Have The Burden Of Proof Under Part (c). 
This Court should affirm the Martinez case because the statute's punctuation and 
rules of statutory construction show that employers have the burden to prove part (c). 
Applying the "elementary rules of punctuation and grammar" supports the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion. Newspaper Agency v. Auditing Div., 938 P2.d 266, 271 (Utah 
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1997). The Court of Appeals rightly considered the statute's punctuation: 
[W]e note that courts should not arbitrarily ignore 
punctuation, but [should] give it due consideration and effect 
where it may be used as an aid to ascertain the legislature's 
purpose. Subsection (l)(b) is a complete sentence ending 
with a period. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b) (2001). 
Thus, subsection (l)(b)'s assignment of the burden of proof 
does not apply to subsection (l)(c). 
Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 f^ 7 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Part (b) is a 
single and complete statement of the employee's burden of proof: When proven, the 
employee has "established entitlement" to permanent total disability benefits. This Court 
should find that the statute's punctuation shows that employers have the burden of proof 
under part (c). 
The statute's construction also shows that employers have the burden to prove part 
(c). Part (b) precisely and clearly assigned employees the burden of proof on three issues, 
but part (c) did not. This Court has repeatedly stated that the specific inclusion or 
exclusion of statutory terms must be considered to understand the meaning of a statute: 
"[Statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the 
exclusion of another. Thus, we should give effect to any omission in the ordinance 
language by presuming that the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98 130 (citing Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, \ 14, 993 P.2d 875, 
1216, with approval) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court of Appeals 
correctly considered the statute's specific inclusion of the employee's burden of proof 
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under part (b) and its specific exclusion of the employee's burden of proof under part (c): 
Because subsection (l)(b) is so clear and explicit on what the 
employee has the burden of proving, subsection (l)(c) should 
be construed as listing the factors on which the employee does 
not have the burden of proof. 
Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 ^ 8. This Court should find that the statute specifically 
included employees in part (b) and purposefully omitted employees from part (c). If so, 
the statute's construction leaves only one possible interpretation: employers have the 
burden to prove part (c). This Court should affirm the Martinez decision and hold that 
employers have the burden to prove part (c). 
4. Requiring Employers to Prove Part (c) Was Consistent With 
Established Precedent. 
This Court should uphold the Martinez decision because it is consistent with 
precedent, both in cases that applied the current statute, and common law cases that 
defined "permanent total disability." The current statute incorporated Utah common law 
when it required employees to prove part (b) and left employers to prove part (c). 
a. The Martinez Decision Was Consistent With Cases That 
Applied the Current Statute. 
This Court should uphold Martinez because it is consistent with permanent total 
disability cases that have applied Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. No case has ever 
collapsed the distinction between the employees' burden of proof under part (b) and the 
employer's burden of proof under part (c), as Appellants have urged this Court to do. To 
the contrary, this Court has already outlined employees' burdens under part (b). 
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In the case of Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 120, the 
employee had been found tentatively permanently totally disabled, and the ALJ ordered 
the employer to pay subsistence benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6). 
The employer's insurer refused because there was no final enforceable order under Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-212. This Court found that there was a conflict, and reasoned that a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability benefits was not an enforceable order. Id. 
at f^ 24, 1208. In reaching its conclusion, this Court outlined the process for permanent 
total disability claims: 
Injured employees seeking permanent total disability 
compensation for work-related injuries must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they have become 
permanently totally disabled as a result of an industrial 
accident or occupational disease. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(l)(b) (2001). 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at % 2, 84 P.3d at 1207 (citation to part (b) in original). This Court 
specifically cited to part (b) for the employees burden of proof in permanent total 
disability cases. This Court also maintained the distinction between employees' burden 
of proof under part (b), and the commission's standards under part (c): "An administrative 
law judge must review the evidence to determine, essentially, whether the employee is 
permanently disabled and unable to perform reasonably available work. Id. § 34A-2-
413(l)(c)." Id- (citation in original). The Court of Appeals' decision in Martinez is 
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consistent with this Court's decision in Thomas.6 
b. The Martinez Decision Is Consistent With Utah Common 
Law Of Permanent Total Disability. 
This Court should affirm Martinez because it is consistent with common law that 
defined "permanent total disability." Among other factors in part (b), employees must 
also prove that they are "permanently totally disabled." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(l)(b)(ii). "Permanent total disability" is a term of art under Utah law, and the current 
statute did not re-define the term. Consequently, Part (b) of the current statute required 
employees to prove that they are "permanently totally disabled" as that term, was defined 
at common law. 
At common law, employees had to prove their permanent total disability under the 
odd lot doctrine.7 To prove permanent total disability, employees had to present evidence 
that they could no longer perform their old job duties, then the burden shifted to the 
employer: 
6
 Accord, Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App 164, 48 
P.3d 252 (distinguishing between facts employees must prove under part (b) from 
Commission's conclusions under part (c)). 
7
 "Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtually every 
jurisdiction, total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether 
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any 
well-known branch of the labor market." Marshall v. Indus. Comm 'n, 681 P.2d 208, 212 
(Utah 1984) (quoting 2 Larson, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.51 at 10-
164.24 (1983) (footnote omitted)). 
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The employee must first present a prima facie case that no 
regular, dependable work is available to him. To do this, the 
employee must present "evidence that he can no longer 
perform the duties required in his occupation and that he 
cannot be rehabilitated1'8 to perform some other type of 
employment. Once the employee has presented a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence 
of regular, steady work that the employee can perform, taking 
into account the employee's education [work experience], 
mental capacity and age. 
Peckv. Eimco Processing Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). The odd lot cases cited by Appellants9 support Petitioner's position. 
In each cited case, this Court held that the employee had met his burden of proof by 
showing that he could no longer perform the duties of his occupation. See Hardman, 725 
8
 Under the prior statute, employees did not have to prove they could not be 
rehabilitated. Instead, they were referred to the Division of Rehabilitation to assess their 
re-employment. See Hardman v. Salt Lake Fleet Mgt, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) 
("[W]e did not mean that the employee must prove on his own that he is unable to be 
rehabilitated. Such a requirement would place the employee in the untenable position of 
assessing his own potential for rehabilitation."). Unlike the prior statute, the current 
statute makes employers responsible for rehabilitation. Employers can prepare re-
employment plans for permanently totally disabled employees. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(6)(ii). 
9
 This Court stated, "The Act does not set forth, however, those often 
unquantifiable factors that establish permanent total disability . . [W]ith regard to 
permanent total disability claims, that a worker may be found totally disabled if he can no 
longer perform work of the general nature he was performing when injured, or any other 
work which a man of his capabilities may be able to do, or to learn to do or for which he 
might be trained." Hardman, 725 P.2d 1323, 1325 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). In other words, the Commission must take into account aU relevant facts 
submitted into evidence, including those not quantified in the Act. Appellants move the 
less argued that employees had to prove "unquantifiable factors," under the common law. 
Brief at 15. 
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P.2d at 1327-28, and Marshall, 681 P.2d at 213. Similarly, in the Mity-Lite case, the 
Court of Appeals held that the employee had made a prima facie showing that he was 
permanently totally disabled, noting that "The record contains uncontroverted evidence of 
his physical impairment and his inability to perform the work required by his former job 
or any similar work." Smith v. Mity-Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah App. 1997). See also, 
Hoskings v. Indus. Comm X 918 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah 1996)10, and Spencer v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 733 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah 1987).u Under Utah common law, employees proved 
they were "permanently totally disabled" if they proved they could no longer perform 
their job duties. 
Under part (b) of the current statute, employees must still prove they are 
"permanently totally disabled" under the common law. The current statute incorporated 
that term from the common law, without redefining it. See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413. Taken together with the rest of part (b), employees must prove: (i) significant 
impairment from the accident or illness, (ii) that they can no longer perform the duties of 
r 
their occupations, and (iii) that the accident or illness directly caused the permanent total 
10
 "Applying the 'odd lot' doctrine, the ALJ first found that Hoskings had met 
his burden of proving that the 1986 industrial accident caused his ankle injury and that he 
could not return to work as a fire fighter." Hoskings, 918 P.2d at 153. 
11
 "That information also constitutes prima facie evidence that Spencer can 
no longer perform the duties required in his occupation and thus he cannot be 
rehabilitated, so that the burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence of regular 
steady work that the employee can perform, taking into consideration the employee's 
education, mental capacity, and age." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 162. 
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disability. Id. Once proven, the employee has "established entitlement" to permanent 
total disability benefits, Id. The burden then shifts to the employer. Id. at § 34A-2-
413(l)(c); Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 ^ 7; accord. Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212. 
Just like the common law, the current statute allows employers plead and prove 
affirmative defenses, including the existence of readily available work. This Court (and 
numerous others) have long recognized that it is most appropriate to have employers 
prove there are jobs the employee can do, instead of employees trying prove they can not 
work.12 The Martinez decision embodied these established common law principles when 
it held that part (c) functioned as employers' affirmative defenses.13 Conversely, 
Appellants have cited to no case (Utah or otherwise) where an employee had to prove that 
he was universally unemployable to be considered permanent totally disabled. Nor does 
the current statute so require, yet this is the crux of Appellant's argument. This Court 
should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision in Martinez, because its statutory 
interpretation that employers have the burden to prove part (c) is consistent with the 
12
 "It is much easier for the [employer] to prove the employability of the 
[employee] for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to prove the universal 
negative of not being employable at any work." Marshall, 681 P.2d at 213 (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
13
 "Thus, if the employee has made her prima facie case, the employer can 
rebut the presumption of a permanent total disability award by showing (i) that the 
employee is gainfully employed, (ii) that the impairment does not limit the employee's 
ability to do basic work activities, (iii) that the industrial-accident-caused impairments do 
not 'prevent the employee from performing the essential functions' of the employee's 
previous work or (iv) that the employee can "perform other work reasonably available." 
Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 \ 1 (footnote omitted). 
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current statute's incorporation of Utah common law. 
5. The Martinez Decision Was Consistent With Public Policy in 
Workers' Compensation Cases. 
This Court should affirm Martinez because it was consistent with this Court's 
policy of liberally construing statutory ambiguity in favor of injured employees. Where 
the statute is ambiguous, this Court looks to policy considerations. Vigos v. 
MountainlandBuilders, 2000 UT 2 at f 13, 993 P.2d 207, 210. This Court construes 
workers compensation statutes liberally in favor of finding coverage. Id. "The 
Work[ersf] Compensation Act is to be construed liberally to further the statutory purposes 
of providing relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents." Pinter Constr. v. Frisby, 
678 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1984). "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to 
construe the Workers' Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage 
when statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction." Heaton v. Second Injury 
Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990). 
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision and construe part (c) as the 
employer's responsibility, because it is consistent with public policy. Construing part (c) 
as the employee's responsibility would be construing the Act against coverage because it 
increases the substantive requirements for permanent total disability claims, making it 
harder for injured workers to prove entitlement to benefits. This Court should affirm the 
Martinez decision because it was consistent with construing the Act liberally in favor of 
coverage. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should deny Appellant's appeal, and 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision in the Martinez case, awarding Mr. Martinez's 
permanent total disability benefits. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2006. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Petitioner Below/Certiorari 
Respondent, Enrique Martinez 
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